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I. INTRODUCTION
The battle against driving while intoxicated ("DWI") has been long and
arduous with many players, successes, and failures. Until relatively recently,
most attention has been focused on driving under the influence of alcohol.'
Accordingly, every state has codified a presumption of impairment for persons
driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08% or above.2 The state must prove
actual impairment for persons driving with blood alcohol levels below 0.08%.'
In the shadows of this war against drunk driving resides the problem of
driving while under the influence of drugs ("DUID"). Drivers under the influ-
ence of drugs inflict no fewer societal costs than do drivers under the influence
of alcohol.4 However, there have been difficulties in enforcing DUID laws for
several reasons. First, a driver may be impaired because that driver ingested
both drugs and alcohol, but the alcohol level may be so miniscule that a blood
alcohol test fails to demonstrate any statistical impairment.5 The alcohol may
effectively mask the effects of drugs such that law enforcement does not sus-
pect any other intoxicants. Thus, without performing qualitative chemical tests
on every driver suspected of impairment, it may be difficult to expose this
illegal conduct.
6
Second, unless officers have received specialized training, it is often a
difficult task to recognize the effects of or be able to identify an illegal sub-
* Charles R. Cordova, Jr., B.S., D.D.S., University of California at San Francisco, is a Juris
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I Although each state has its own terminology for driving after having consumed a
psychoactive substance, for consistency this Article will use the general terms "driving while
intoxicated" ("DWI") to mean driving while impaired due to drugs or alcohol according to
law; "DUID" to mean driving while physically impaired due to drugs; and "per se DUID" to
mean driving with the presence of either a specific quantity of drugs in the body or any
detectible level (varies by state), without respect to whether one is physically impaired.
2 Mothers Against Drunk Driving, .08 BAC per se - Issue Brief, http://www.madd.org/take
action/7584 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
3 See, e.g., infra note 12.
1 J. Michael Walsh et al., Drugs and Driving, in 5 TRAImc INJURY PREVENTnON 241, 244
(2004).
1 Mark F. Lewis & Betty J. Buchan, The Drugged Driver and the Need for a "Per Se " Law,
FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1998, at 32.
6 See Mark Hansen, Drugged State, ABA J., Dec. 2005, at 12.
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stance in the field amongst so many potential intoxicants.7 It may be that a
driver's behavior is suspect due to the illegal use of intoxicants, the legal use of
over-the-counter cold remedies, or just fatigue. Lastly, even where law
enforcement confirms illegal drug use through testing, prosecutors have found
it difficult to prove that the driver is actually impaired and thus convict for
DUID.8
These circumstances have set the stage for a silent revolution in DWI law9
advocated by victims of DUID and with the ever-willing participation of well-
meaning legislators.' Unsatisfied by the inability of prosecutors to convict
those charged with DUID with any regularity through standard means," six-
teen states and several European nations have instituted per se DUID statutes
that burden a defendant with the presumption of impairment when he drives
with any detectable amount of an illegal substance in his or her body. 2 One of
the architects of Nevada's DUID law was former State Senator Jon Porter. He
has since been elected to the United States Congress and has been actively
trying to institute a federal provision for DUID.1 3
This Article will examine per se DUID laws in the context of a case
regarding marijuana use in Nevada. First, the Article describes the principal
case in Nevada. Next, a survey of the relevant scientific issues is undertaken to
orient the reader. In conclusion, the Article analyzes constitutional problems
7 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND TRAFFIC SAFETY, ICADTS
WORKING GROUP REPORT: ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRIVING (2000), http://www.icadts.org/
reports/Drugs-FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter ICADTS REPORT].
8 Lewis & Buchan, supra note 5, at 34.
9 ICADTS REPORT, supra note 7.
'0 See, e.g., Makes Various Changes Concerning Controlled Substances and Impaired
Operation of Vehicles and Vessels: Hearing on S.B. 481 before the S. Comm. on Judiciary,
1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 2-5 (Nev. 1999) (testimony by parents who had lost children in acci-
dents caused by drugged drivers).
I I Generally, state statutes demand proof that a driver was actually impaired. See, e.g. CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §316.193 (West 2007); TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon 2005).
12 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381(A)(3) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 4177(a)(6)
(2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a)(6) (West 2007); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
501(a)(6) (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-5-1(1)(c) (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 321J.2(1)(c) (West 2007); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(8) (West 2007); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169A.20(l)(7) (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-138.1(a)(3) (West
2007); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3802(d) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2(b)(2)
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 4 1-6a-517(2) (West 2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.63(l)(a)
(West 2006) (these statutes irrebuttably presume impairment when certain controlled sub-
stances are found in a driver's body). Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia are alone in providing
specific quantitative levels. NEV. REV. STAT. ArN. § 484.379 (West 2007); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(I)(j) (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (West 2007). Min-
nesota exempts marijuana and its metabolites from per se status. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169A.20(1)(7) (West 2007). Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and France all have per
se DUID laws. Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 249-50.
1" Rep. Porter introduced H.R. 3907 in the 108th Congress, which died in committee. This
bill would have phased in a requirement that the states pass laws providing mandatory mini-
mum sentences for those convicted of driving under the influence of an illegal drug. H.R.
3907, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004). Those portions of the bill relating to research were
subsequently passed in the 109th Congress. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-50, 119 Stat.
1144, 1539-40 (2005).
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with per se DUID statutes, strategies employed by other states, and presents a
policy argument based on the prohibition against character evidence.
II. THE JESSICA WILLIAMS CASES
A. Introduction
Nevadans have had the opportunity to watch a case involving Nevada's
per se DUID statute14 play out publicly over the past several years. On March
19, 2000, twenty-year-old Jessica Williams was driving on Interstate 15 with a
female companion when she claims to have fallen asleep at the wheel.' 5 Her
van then drifted into the median, causing a collision that resulted in the deaths
of six teenagers who were performing trash cleanup as a part of the Probation
Service Work Program. 6 Williams conceded that she had taken one tablet of
ecstasy approximately twelve hours prior and that she had shared one "bowl" of
marijuana roughly two hours prior.17 Her passenger in the vehicle had been
sleeping. She testified that she awoke as they were proceeding into the median
and saw Williams asleep at the wheel.' 8 Other drivers who witnessed the inci-
dent testified "that it was apparent that the driver had fallen asleep. '"19
Jessica Williams's criminal case began in Nevada State District Court,
twice visited the Supreme Court of Nevada, and she continues to seek relief in
the federal system. Williams was charged with (1) driving while under the
influence of a controlled substance (DUID)2° and/or driving with a prohibited
14 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2007) states in section (1) that it is unlawful to
drive: (a) while under the influence of alcohol or (b) with a concentration of alcohol of 0.08
or greater in blood or breath; section (2) states that it is unlawful to drive (a) while under the
influence of any controlled substance, or (b) under the combined influence of alcohol and a
controlled substance; section (3) states that it is unlawful to drive with an amount of a pro-
hibited substance in blood or urine that is greater than or equal to the enumerated list of
quantities for 11 specific controlled substances. For marijuana, the amount is 2 ng per ml of
blood/10 ng per ml of urine; for marijuana metabolite, the amount is 5 ng per ml of blood/15
ng per ml of urine. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3795 (West 2007) is the felony DWI law
with the same elements as § 484.379.
11 Williams v. State (Williams 1), 50 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Nev. 2002) (en banc); Hugo Martin,
California and the West: Five Killed, Two Hurt As Van Strikes Work Crew Near Las Vegas,
L. A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at A3.
16 Peter O'Connell, Families of Six Teens Killed Picking Up Trash File Lawsuit, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 18, 2000 at lB. The teenagers were working to perform restitution to
satisfy their probation requirements to avoid juvenile detention. Joe Schoenmann, Five
Teens in Work Crew Killed in Accident on 1-15, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at IA.
The work crew was comprised of many teenagers and there were several civil suits relating
to the circumstances of their presence. O'Connell, supra. A key question was whether a
lack of adequate safety protocols, constituted negligence that was a superseding intervening
cause in Williams's case. Id.
17 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, Williams v. Bodo, No. CV-S-04-1620 (D.Nev.
Nov. 22, 2004). The Ninth Circuit, on November 15, 2006, determined that this petition was
not a § 2254 petition, leaving her free to file for habeas relief anew. Williams v. Bodo, No.
06-71199, Order (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006). On November 27, 2006, the case was reopened.
Williams v. Bodo, No. CV-S-04-1620 (D.Nev. Nov. 27, 2006).
18 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1118.
19 Id.; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 17.
20 NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 484.3795(1)(d) (West 2007).
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substance in her body (per se DUID), 2' (2) reckless driving, (3) involuntary
manslaughter, (4) possession of a controlled substance, and (5) use of a con-
trolled substance. 2 2 After a two-week trial, the court instructed the jury that
they could only choose one among the first three counts.
On count (1) the jury could find her guilty of DWI based on two alternate
theories: actual impairment (DUID) or presence of an illegal substance (per se
DUID), or both. 2 3 The jury chose to convict Williams of driving while intoxi-
cated based on the presence of an illegal substance (per se DUID), not actual
impairment (DUID).2 4 Additionally, they found her guilty of use and posses-
sion of a controlled substance and being under the influence of a controlled
substance.2 5
Williams petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for review. 26 There she
made four arguments explored below, each challenging the constitutionality of
the per se DUID statute.27 In addition to these four arguments about the per se
DUID statute, she claimed a violation of double jeopardy, a lack of proximate
cause, and an evidentiary claim related to the preservation of her blood
sample.28
B. Equal Protection
Williams first argued that the per se DUID statute was unconstitutional
because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Nevada Constitution.2 9
She claimed the statute treated drivers with controlled substances in their sys-
tems differently, depending on the circumstances of their ingestion.30 Those
drivers who ingested controlled substances through legal means were subject to
a rebuttable presumption of impairment. 3 1 Those who used illegal means were
subject to an irrebuttable presumption of impairment.32 Williams claimed that
this distinction fails to ascertain whether the proscribed conduct actually causes
the harm of driving while impaired that the legislature intended to prohibit.3 3
The court, in framing its decision, seized upon an argument made in a
footnote in Williams's opening brief. There she argued for review based on
strict scrutiny because driving is a fundamental right.34 The court explained
that only those statutes involving fundamental rights or those based on suspect
21 Id. § 484.3795(1)(f).
22 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1118.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1119.
25 Id.
26 Nevada has no intermediate appellate court.
27 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3795(1)(t) (West 2007).
28 Additionally there were miscellaneous claims of error disposed of by the court in the final
paragraph of its decision, unrelated to the issues of DUID. Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1127.
29 Id. at 1120.
30 Id.
31 Brief of Appellant at 14-15, Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116 (Nev. 2002) (No. 37785)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
32 Id.
33 Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 10 n.2.
34 Williams I, 50 P.3d at 1120.
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classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.35 Statutes failing to involve these
two issues are evaluated under rational basis scrutiny.36 Rational basis scrutiny
only requires the government to demonstrate that the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.37 The court declared that neither driving nor drug
use qualify as fundamental rights and thus were ineligible for review under
strict scrutiny.38
In determining the constitutionality of a state statute scrutinized under the
rational basis standard, the court need only find that there is "any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion."39 A statute shall not fail under rational basis review "because in practice
it results in some inequality."40 The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that
the statute finds its rational basis in the state's dual interests in promoting high-
way safety and deterring illegal drug use.4 In coming to its conclusion, the
court took note of several sister-state decisions upholding the constitutionality
of per se DUID laws, so long as the laws made exception for the legal use of
controlled substances.4 2
C. Due Process
1. Substantive Due Process
Williams next argued that the per se DUID statute was unconstitutional
because the statute violated her right to substantive due process.43 The court
concluded that this claim mirrored her Equal Protection argument.'44 She
claimed that the state had no legitimate purpose in infringing upon her right to
drive with prohibited substances in her body so long as she was not impaired.4 5
Preventing her from driving in her unimpaired condition, she argued, was not
rationally related to any legitimate state interest. 46 The court again stated that
unless the right is fundamental or the class suspect, it will apply rational basis
scrutiny.4 7
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1120-21, n.15. Additionally, the court addressed Williams's claim that the statute
failed to differentiate between legal and illegal users of marijuana in the context of the
medical marijuana debate. Id. at 1121. At that time Nevada had not yet approved medicinal
marijuana use, so there were no legal marijuana users. Id. It is now legal to use medical
marijuana in Nevada. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.310 (West 2007) (effective Oct. 1,
2001).
43 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1122.
44 id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
[Vol. 7:570
DWI AND DRUGS
2. Vagueness
Third, Williams argued that the statute violated her right to due process
because the statute is unconstitutionally vague.48 She argued that an individual
of ordinary intelligence is unable to determine which components of the mari-
juana plant are illegal to consume or which metabolites formed in the body
after consumption are illegal.4 9 Additionally, an individual cannot know when
her body attains the threshold limit of any prohibited substance. 50 The court
explained that a statute "may be void for vagueness only if it is void in all of its
applications."'" A statute provides adequate warning when its language con-
tains "a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning" within the statutory
scheme.5" The court determined that Williams, as a regular marijuana user,
was well aware of the plain meaning of the term marijuana and that the illegal
metabolites are reasonably understood to be those formed as a result of using
marijuana. 53 Moreover, the court rejected her claim because the law permits no
legal use without a prescription, 54 thus her subjective knowledge of the thresh-
old levels in her body was irrelevant.55
3. Overbreadth
Finally, Williams challenged the statute as being overly broad.56 Here,
Williams claimed that the statute imposed punishment not only on those
engaged in the targeted conduct of driving while intoxicated, but that it also
punished those engaged in legal conduct.57 Specifically, Williams claimed that
the statute's generic reference to marijuana and its metabolites could potentially
be referencing more than 400 compounds, a great number of which are pharma-
cologically inactive. In the Nevada Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has
a specific definition that focuses on those components of the plant that contain
pharmacologically active constituents.5 9 This demonstrates that there are many
specific components of the marijuana plant that may be legally consumed. Wil-
liams argued that although legal under the controlled substances act, one may
consume various parts of the marijuana plant and still be punished under the
per se DUID statute.6 ° Here the statute captures otherwise legal conduct in a
broad net of prohibition. 6' The court responded that the overbreadth doctrine
applies when a statute infringes upon constitutionally protected conduct and
48 Id. at 1122.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1123.
51 Id. at 1122.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1123.
54 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.411 (West 2007) (makes it illegal to knowingly use or to be
under the influence of a controlled substance without prescription).
55 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1123.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 19.
59 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.096 (West 2007).
60 Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 20.
61 Id.
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since the court had determined that neither driving nor drug use was so pro-
tected, this claim was also without merit.
62
D. Claims Unrelated to DWI
1. Double Jeopardy
Williams argued that she was subjected to double jeopardy. She claimed
that since she was found not guilty on a theory of actual impairment,63 a con-
current guilty finding of per se impairment' violated her Fifth Amendment
right to be free from double jeopardy.65 She argued that by directing the jury to
make separate findings of guilt with respect to actual or per se impairment, the
trial court treated each as a separate offense.66 The Supreme Court of Nevada
recognized her claim as asserting a right to be free of "multiple punishments for
the same offense."' 67 The court applied the Blockburger test.6 8 The test deter-
mines whether the same act violates two distinct statutory provisions. 69 An act
results in two distinct offenses when the elements of one require proof of an
additional fact not required in the other.70 Here the court determined that the
elements needed to prove actual impairment were different from those required
for per se impairment; and additionally, it appears that the legislature had a
different intent in passing each.7" The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded
that since the elements of each statute were different, acquittal of one and con-
viction of another did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.7 2
2. Remaining Claims
Finally, Williams argued that the trial court erred by not allowing her to
present evidence of the county's negligence in placing the victims in harm's
way.73 The Supreme Court of Nevada rejected this, agreeing with the trial
judge's ruling that such evidence was irrelevant because no third party negli-
gence would relieve her guilt if it was shown that she proximately caused the
deaths.7 ' Additionally, she argued that the state improperly handled the blood
evidence by failing to refrigerate it, thus it was unavailable to the defense for
independent testing.75 The court rejected this argument, stating that the loss or
destruction of evidence violates due process "only [where]... the state acted in
bad faith or... the defendant suffers undue prejudice and the exculpatory value
62 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1123-24.
63 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379(2)(a) (West 2007) (actual impairment).
64 Id. § 484.379(3) (per se impairment).
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Williams I, 50 P.3d at 1124.
66 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1124.
67 Id.
68 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1120, 1124-25.
72 Id. at 1124-25. Williams appealed this double jeopardy claim to federal court, where it
was rejected. Williams v. Warden, 422 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
73 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1125.
74 Id. at 1126.
75 Id.
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of the evidence was apparent before . . . [the] loss or [destruction]," and then
finding that she failed to satisfy the elements.76
The arguments Jessica Williams presented failed to persuade the Supreme
Court of Nevada. The court appreciated the legislature's desire to protect state
roadways and granted it great deference in providing for the public's protection
against drivers under the influence of drugs. The results reached by the court
were not unexpected in a direct appeal.
III. MARIJUANA SCIENCE
It is necessary to understand the basics about marijuana and its interaction
with the human body if one is to reach valid conclusions about its effects on
driving and make informed policy decisions based on these conclusions. This
section will provide an overview of marijuana science as it relates to DUID and
per se DUID. It will first explain some basic facts about marijuana; second, it
will explain how drug testing can catch marijuana's presence in the body long
after its use; third, it will explain how a person can test positive for marijuana
use by using legal, over the counter, commercial products; and lastly, it will
explain how drug testing levels are arrived at and used in various settings.
A. The Basics
Cannabis Sativa is the plant that yields the substance commonly known as
marijuana or hemp.77 The primary psychoactive agent in marijuana is A9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). 78 The psychoactive THC is most abundant in the
upper third of the cannabis stalk, its leaves, and its flowers.79 THC is also
found in the synthetically-produced drug dronabinol, trade named Marinol®.80
Naturally occurring THC found in the cannabis plant is classified as a
Schedule I controlled substance, meaning it has a high potential for abuse, no
currently accepted medical use, and a lack of accepted safety.8 1 The synthetic
drug dronabinol is classified under Schedule II, meaning it has a high potential
for abuse, that there are current accepted medical uses with severe restrictions,
and that it may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. 82
76 Id. at 1126-27 (quoting Leonard v. State, 17 P.3d 397, 407 (Nev. 2001)). Williams also
unsuccessfully claimed that the failure to hear evidence on this matter until after trial consti-
tuted error. Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1127.
77 DENNIS L. KASPER, M.D., ET AL., HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2571
(16th ed. 2005).
78 Marilyn A. Huestis et al., Detection Times of Marijuana Metabolites in Urine by Immu-
noassay and GC-MS, 19 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 443, 444 (1995) [hereinafter Huestis
et al., Detection Times].
79 T. Z. Bosy & K. A. Cole, Consumption and Quantitation of Tetrahydrocannabinol in
Commercially Available Hemp Seed Oil Products, 24 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 562, 563
(2000).
80 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 3334 (60th ed. 2006) [hereinafter PDR].
8l 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000). Both Nevada and the federal government maintain similar lists
of scheduled drugs. Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.166 (West 2007).
82 PDR, supra note 80, at 3335 (Dronabinal is indicated for treatment of excessive weight
loss in AIDS patients and to treat nausea associated with cancer chemotherapy in those
failing to respond to conventional anti-nausea preparations); 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.176 (West 2007).
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The National Institute on Drug Abuse reports that in 2004, over 14 million
Americans over the age of twelve used marijuana in the month directly preced-
ing their survey, and that from 1995 through 2001 there were approximately 2.6
million new marijuana users each year.83 Recreational marijuana use has
existed for centuries and continues to be the most common positive result in
workplace drug testing.84 The most common method by which to ingest THC
is through smoking the constituents of the cannabis plant.85
B. In the Body
When marijuana is smoked, the THC is absorbed into the bloodstream
through the lungs.86 Peak blood concentrations of THC are seen immediately
after smoking marijuana.87 THC is immediately circulated throughout the
body where, because of its chemical properties, it is sequestered in fat tissue.88
Once there, the amount of THC available in the blood is limited by the degree
to which it is released by the fat tissue over time.89 Think of this as an equilib-
rium, similar to how a river may deposit sediment along its shores at times,
while at other times it erodes the sediment. In the body, however, the interplay
between THC sequestration in fat tissue and its release into the blood is depen-
dent not on chance but a multitude of biochemical variables. The speed with
which THC is released back into the blood stream is highly variable across
individuals. It generally occurs almost completely within twenty-four hours
after smoking, but it may not end for several weeks. 90
The behavioral and psychological effects of THC are perceptible within
minutes of smoking marijuana; they achieve their peak within ten to thirty min-
utes, last roughly two hours, and are mostly gone within three to five hours.9 '
As THC circulates, it is rapidly broken down into over twenty metabolites,
83 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., National Institute on Drug Abuse, Marijuana
(2006), http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDFInfoFacts/MarijuanaO6.pdf; Nora D. Volkow, M.D.,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., National Institute on Drug Abuse, Marijuana Abuse
(2002), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/RRMarijuana.pdf.
I Albert D. Fraser et al., Drug and Chemical Metabolites in Clinical Toxicology Investiga-
tions: the Importance of Ethylene Glycol, Methanol and Cannabinoid Metabolite Analyses,
35 CLINICAL BIOCHEMISTRY 501, 507 (2002).
85 KASPER et al., supra note 77, at 2571.
86 Marilyn A Huestis & Edward J. Cone, Urinary Excretion Half-Life of ll-nor-9-carboxy-
A9-tetrahydrocannabinol in Humans, 20 THERAPEUTIC DRUG MONITORING 570 (1998) [here-
inafter Huestis & Cone, Urinary Excretion].
87 Marilyn A. Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinoids I: Absorption of THC and Formation of
JJ-OH-THC and THCCOOH During and After Smoking Marijuana, 16 J. ANALYTICAL Tox-
ICOLOGY 276 (1992) [hereinafter Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinoids I].
88 Huestis & Cone, Urinary Excretion, supra note 86, at 570.
89 Id.; Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinnoids I, supra note 87, at 276.
90 Huestis et al., Detection Times, supra note 78, at 444; Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinoids
1, supra note 87, at 276.
91 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DRUGS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACT SHEETS (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/job]85drugs/index.htm. The major-
ity of dronabinol's effects are reported to last four to six hours, with only the appetite
stimulating effect lasting twenty-four hours or longer. PDR, supra note 80, at 2544.
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most notably THC-COOH.9 2 This is the substance that is used most frequently
in testing for marijuana use.93
THC-COOH is not a psychoactive substance. 94 It is used for testing
because it remains detectable in the body longer, and in more substantial quan-
tities than THC or other active metabolites.95 The synthetic version of THC,
dronabinal, is chemically indistinguishable from the naturally occurring vari-
ety.96 Thus, there is no way to determine with laboratory tests whether some-
one consumed THC legally or illegally. 97
Drug testing for marijuana is unique among targeted illegal substances
because the metabolite, THC-COOH, remains detectable in the body long after
the marijuana use.98 Many scientific studies report that subjects may test posi-
tively for marijuana three to ten days after use.99 The length of time during
which THC-COOH may be detected in an individual depends on how fre-
quently they use marijuana.1 °°
C. Legal Products Containing THC
The seeds of the cannabis plant contain a good source of omega fatty
acids.1"1 These fatty acids are the same that are found in fish and nuts and are
touted frequently in the media as an important part of a healthy diet. o2 For this
reason, there are many commercially available hemp products for sale without
92 KASPER ET AL., supra note 77, at 2571; Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinnoids 1, supra note
87, at 276. "THC-COOH" will be used as the abbreviation for 1 1-nor-9-carboxy-A 9-
tetrahydrocannabinol, it was also referred to as "the carboxylic acid" in Williams I. State v.
Williams, 93 P.3d 1258 (Nev. 2004).
93 See Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinnoids I, supra note 87, at 276.
94 Edward J. Cone & Marilyn A. Huestis, Relating Blood Concentrations of Tetrahydrocan-
nabinol and Metabolites to Pharmacologic Effects and Time of Marijuana Usage, 15 THER-
APEUTIC DRUG MONITORING 527 (1993).
95 Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinnoids I, supra note 87, at 276.
96 Richard A. Gustafson et al., Urinary Cannabinoids Detection Times after Controlled
Oral Administration of A9-Tetrahydrocannabinol to Humans, 49 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 1114,
1122 (2003).
97 Id.
98 Cone & Huestis, supra note 94, at 530; Fraser et al., supra note 84, at 508; Gustafson et
al., supra note 96, at 1115; Marilyn A. Huestis & Edward J. Cone, Differentiating New
Marijuana Use From Residual Drug Excretion in Occasional Marijuana Users, 22 J. ANA-
LYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 445, 453 (1998); Marilyn A. Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinoids I:
Models for Prediction of Time of Marijuana Exposure from Plasma Concentrations of A9-
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and 11-nor-9-carboxy-A9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THCCOOH),
16 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 283, 287-89 (1992); Walsh et al., Drugs and Driving, supra
note 4, at 246.
99 Fraser et al., supra note 84, at 508; Gustafson et al., supra note 96, at 1115; Huestis &
Cone, Differentiating New Marijuana Use, supra note 98, at 453; Walsh et al., Drugs and
Driving, supra note 4, at 246. One study reported detection seventy-seven days after use at
a cutoff level of 20ng/mL THCCOOH. Huestis et al., Detection Times, supra note 78, at
444.
100 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 91.
101 Bosy & Cole, supra note 79, at 562-63.
102 See, e.g., American Heart Association, Fish and Omega-3 Fatty Acids, http://www.
americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=4632 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
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a prescription. 10 3 These products are made from the cannabis plant and contain
detectable levels of THC.' ° 4
There are several studies demonstrating that using these legal products can
yield a positive test for marijuana metabolites using the federal government's
threshold values for detection.' 0 5 From these studies, one may logically infer
the possibility of a conviction in Nevada under the DUID statute for using
legally purchased products. In fact, there have been at least two failed prosecu-
tions in military courts for drug use where the defendants successfully claimed
that their positive test results were from legal hemp products.
10 6
D. Drug Testing and Standards
The majority of drug testing for the presence of marijuana is to determine
whether individuals have used the drug at all. This appears to be done most
often in the context of mandatory workplace drug testing. The federal govern-
ment initiated drug testing for certain federal employees pursuant to an execu-
tive order in 1986.107 The Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
has adopted guidelines used to evaluate employee drug tests for the presence of
marijuana.' 0 8 It is germane that the purpose of these federal guidelines is to
ascertain whether an individual has used marijuana at all - not whether the
individual is impaired to any extent."° These guidelines provide specific
amounts of marijuana metabolites that must be present in the sample to yield a
positive test." 0 The same numerical values are used by the Department of
Defense ("DOD") in its drug testing program."'
The Nevada legislature adopted the values HHS used when passing the per
se DUID statute in 1999.112 In the assembly committee hearing for the bill
there was testimony indicating that there was a difficulty in successfully prose-
cuting drivers under the influence of drugs.' As the committee evaluated
various options, a representative of the Nevada District Attorney's Association
testified that drug testing needed to consist of blood or urine because "if hair
was tested, usage could be detected from three or four weeks ago and would
have no bearing on the current ability to drive."' 1 4 The committee subse-
quently considered the need to prevent positive tests due to environmental
103 Bosy & Cole, supra note 79, at 563.
1o4 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., supra note 91. The process of harvesting these oils is not
efficient enough to exclude all THC. Bosy & Cole, supra note 79, at 563.
105 Gustafson et al., supra note 96, at 1115; Bosy & Cole, supra note 79, at 563; U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., supra note 91.
106 Bosy & Cole, supra note 79, at 563.
107 Exec. Order No. 12564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (Sept. 17, 1986).
108 Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg.
11,970 (Apr. 11, 1988).
109 Id.
110 Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 69 Fed. Reg.
19,644, 19,659 (Apr. 13, 2004) (revised mandatory guidelines).
''1 HHS lowered its initial screening values in 1994, bringing them in line with DOD values
established in 1992. Gustafson et al., supra note 96, at 1121.
112 Hearing on S.B. 481 before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 12-
15 (Nev., May. 5, 1999) (hereinafter Assemb. Comm. Hearing).
113 S. Comm. Hearing, supra note 10, at 3.
l14 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 112, at 12 (quoting Ben Graham).
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exposure that manifest from hair testing or other causes." 5 A pathologist testi-
fied that the federal government had numerical standards for testing for the
presence of illegal drugs and that by using said standards the legislature could
avoid prosecuting individuals with environmental exposure." 6 The committee
adopted the federal numerical values."l 7 It appears from the legislative history
that the bill was designed to detect the presence of illegal drugs in quantities
significant enough to cause impairment.
However, the resulting statute does not achieve the goal of criminalizing
ingestion of marijuana in amounts sufficient to cause impairment while driving.
The very concerns that guided the committee in not using a hair test are not
accounted for in the current statute.
Marijuana metabolism is unique when considering the schedule of illegal
drugs. It has the capacity to remain with the user longer than most others and is
thus detectible in laboratory testing longer than other illegal drugs." 8 The leg-
islature made cursory attempts to protect Nevadans against testing positive for
drug use through environmental exposure and thus, one may assume, on the
basis of past drug use, but ultimately failed by wholesale adoption of the fed-
eral workplace guidelines for quantitation.
11 9
IV. ANALYSIS
Per se DUID statutes like the one in Nevada are poised to cause unjust
results over time. They are constructed in a way that requires a conviction
based only on the presence of miniscule amounts of a drug or its metabo-
lites.12 0 They fail to take into account the relevant question in these inquiries:
whether the driver was impaired. They fail to reflect any logical analysis of
whether an individual is driving while impaired and instead only determine
whether the individual has used drugs in the recent past.
The Nevada statute casts a blanket prohibition against using drugs without
a prescription prior to driving for the period of up to a week or longer. When
taking into account the scientific evidence, the statute is overinclusive because
it punishes people for using drugs in the recent past without consideration of
their actual impairment. It cannot be disputed that illegal drug use in this coun-
try is a problem that has proven intractable. However, employing a DWI statu-
tory scheme like Nevada's goes beyond reasonable limits in attacking the
problem because it punishes absent impairment.
The Nevada statute and those like it that provide irrefutable evidence of
impaired driving based only on the presence of remnants of drugs in the body
''5 Id.
116 Id. (testimony of Fred Hillerby).
117 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2007).
118 Cone & Huestis, supra note 94, at 530; Fraser et al., supra note 84, at 508; Gustafson et
al., supra note 96, at 1115; Huestis & Cone, Differentiating New Marijuana Use, supra note
98, at 453; Huestis et al., Blood Cannabinoids H, supra note 98, at 287-89; Walsh et al.,
Drugs and Driving, supra note 4, at 246.
119 Assemb. Comm. Hearing, supra note 112; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West
2007).
120 See Marijuana Science, supra Section III; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West
2007).
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are unconstitutional. First, this analysis describes how the statute does not rest
on a rational basis. Second, this analysis addresses the fact that there is no
exception for legal users of medical marijuana. Third, this analysis will
describe another case of DWI with a very different outcome under the same
statutory scheme. Fourth, laws and strategies from other states that take mari-
juana metabolism into account are described. And finally, this analysis
explains how using the evidence of prior drug use as the statute does is really
nothing more than using a defendant's prior bad act of drug use to prove what
may be factually false - driving while impaired.
A. Equal Protection
Both the United States and Nevada Constitutions deny the government the
power to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws.' The basic
presumption is that the laws are constitutional and that they do not violate equal
protection. However in the famous footnote from United States v. Carolene
Products Co., the United States Supreme Court held that certain constitutional
claims warranted a more searching analysis. 1 22 The footnote explained that
more exacting judicial scrutiny must apply where the law limits the exercise of
a fundamental right or where the law has an impact on a class of individuals
that is comprised of a discrete and insular minority, against whom there has
been a history of discrimination and thus, who are unable to protect themselves
through the normal political process.'
2 3
The Carolene Products footnote marked the beginning of the current
equal protection framework that generally employs three tiers of scrutiny based
on the degree of protection that should be afforded to a group exhibiting certain
characteristics or the exercise of an important or fundamental right. The scru-
tiny least deferential to the government is strict scrutiny. This is applied only
where the classification is based on a class strongly mirroring the factors in the
Carolene Products footnote or the exercise of a right deemed fundamental.
The level of scrutiny most deferential to the government is rational basis scru-
tiny. As the default level of scrutiny, rational basis is applied where the classi-
fication implicates no fundamental right nor does the group demonstrate any
indicia of being suspect. The middle level of scrutiny is appropriately termed
intermediate scrutiny. This level of scrutiny was applied initially for claims of
gender discrimination but has been extended to include many claims not appro-
priately evaluated under either extreme level.12 4
The Nevada statutory scheme distinguishes people in three ways. First,
the per se DUID statute distinguishes between legal drug users and non-legal
drug users in allowing them the privilege of driving. Both groups of drug users
are similarly situated with respect to whether they are actually impaired. The
only difference lies in whether they consumed the drugs legally or illegally.
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
122 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
123 Id.
124 Intermediate scrutiny currently applies to the claims of non-marital children, undocu-
mented alien children with regard to education, to the regulation of commercial speech, and
to the regulation of speech in public forums. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CoNrsTrru-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.5 (3d ed. 2006).
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Second, the per se DUID statute distinguishes between people who legally use
marijuana to treat their disease and those who legally use other drugs with
psychoactive properties to treat their disease. These groups are similarly situ-
ated except regarding the therapy they legally use to treat their condition.
Third, the statutory scheme regarding illegal drugs generally draws a distinc-
tion between illegal drug users and illegal drug users who drive in an
unimpaired condition. All of the drug users in these third groups are similarly
situated with respect to their drug use; the only difference is that the latter
group has driven an automobile after the effects of the drugs have run their
course.
None of these three classifications rest on the exercise of a fundamental
right, nor are the groups comprised of members who are members of a pro-
tected class. Thus, statutes such as these are properly evaluated under rational
basis scrutiny. The most logical classification for a law regulating traffic safety
to make is one that distinguishes between individuals based on whether a driver
is impaired or not. The Nevada per se DUID statute fails to do this in any
rational way.
Rational basis scrutiny begins with the presumption that the law is consti-
tutional. The burden is on the challenger to show that it is not rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest. Rational basis review will invalidate a
law only where there are no "state of facts reasonably ... conceived that would
sustain it." '2 5 Further, the burden is on the challenger "to negative every con-
ceivable basis which might support it.' 26 However, "the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest on some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."1 27
In Williams's case, the Supreme Court of Nevada determined that the
state's interests in promoting highway safety and deterring illegal drug use are
legitimate and that the statute is rationally related to these interests.128 The
court agreed that imposing harsher punishments against drivers who have used
illegal drugs at some point in the near past is acceptable. 129 However, common
sense dictates that the connection between the state's interest in highway safety
and the per se DUID statute is illusory where the driver is not actually
impaired. This disconnect is based on a failure to recognize that drivers who
have the remnants of drugs in their systems may not be even remotely
impaired. Scientific studies demonstrate that the remnants of marijuana may be
present in an individual long after consuming the drug.
Rational basis scrutiny begins with an examination of the state's interest.
Here, the state's interest in deterring illegal drug use seems to have been
revealed for the first time in Williams's case. The legislative history reveals
that the focus of the law is, as its title states, to address "Driving Under The
Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Controlled or Prohibited Substance[s]. ' ' 3 °
125 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
126 Madden v. Commonwealth of Ky., 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
127 Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Va., 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
128 Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1120.
129 Id. at 1121.
130 NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 484.389 (West 2007).
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Regardless, under rational basis scrutiny any conceivable justification is ade-
quate to sustain the law.
In the Nevada Constitution, however, Article 4, Section 17 states that
"[e]ach law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and mat-
ter, properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in
the title .... " The
main test of the application of the clause to a particular statute is whether the title is
of such a character as to mislead the public and the members of the legislature as to
the subjects embraced in the act ... [and] if the numerous provisions contained in an
act have one general subject which is indicated by the title, and are logically germane
to the subject expressed in the title, the act is not obnoxious to the constitutional
requirement .... 131
In State v. Payne, the Supreme Court of Nevada held a statute invalid that
appeared to regulate the inspection of cattle hides. 132 Provisions of the act also
regulated the sale of beef. The court held this duality violated the Nevada
Constitution. It determined that the statute was calculated to mislead the public
and members of the legislature.
The per se DUID statute is similarly misleading. The statute contains pro-
visions that essentially punish the use of illegal drugs (or legal drugs in the case
of medical marijuana) under the title of driving under the influence. The legis-
lative history shows that the committee drafting the law was focused on provid-
ing assistance to law enforcement in fighting the problem of people driving
under the influence of drugs. It was not the committee's focus to criminalize
drug users who were driving after the effects of drug use have subsided. In
light of the Nevada constitutional provision requiring a statute's provisions to
have one general subject comprised by the title, the state's interest in deterring
illegal drug use is not rationally related to the per se DUID statute.' 33
Legal burdens imposed by the criminal justice system should bear some
relationship to the degree of wrongdoing or responsibility. 134 This concept
should endure even under the deference afforded the government under the
rational basis test. Simply having trace amounts of drugs or their metabolites in
a person's system generally does not justify severe punishment; 135 driving in
that condition, when not impaired, should not justify it either. Where the pun-
ishment can be twenty years in prison as in Williams's case,' 3 6 there must be a
closer relationship between the degree of wrongdoing and the punishment.137
Per se DUID statutes provide that drivers innocent of DUID under a standard of
actual impairment may be punished instead under the per se statute because
they have committed the separate and distinct crime of using illegal drugs.
The Supreme Court of Nevada appears to have accepted this scheme
solely for prosecutorial efficiency. Recognizing that the legislature had a prob-
lem writing laws that would effectively prosecute drivers actually impaired due
131 State v. Payne, 295 P. 770, 771-72 (Nev. 1931).
132 Id.
113 See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
134 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
135 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.411 (West 2007).
136 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3795 (West 2007).
137 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,.220 (1982).
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to drug use, the Supreme Court of Nevada sacrificed those individuals that
many in society do not view favorably: illegal drug users.
B. Medical Marijuana
In 2001, Nevada legalized the use of medical marijuana.' 38 Future
defendants prosecuted under the per se DUID statute for marijuana use will
have the advantage of invoking with renewed vigor a case from the Georgia
Supreme Court that was cited in Williams I but rejected. The Supreme Court of
Georgia held that because medical marijuana use was legal and since the per se
DUID statute excepted legal users, Georgia's per se DUID law with respect to
marijuana violated Equal Protection. 139 They explained that there was no
rational basis to criminalize illegal marijuana users with remnants of the drug in
their body, for the exact same behavior that is legal by authorized users. 140 The
Georgia Supreme Court seems to have realized that the tenuous basis on which
per se DUID was rationalized was finally stretched to the breaking point where
there also exists a law allowing medical marijuana use in the state.
The holding of the Georgia Supreme Court in Love has been subsequently
distinguished, further bolstering the basic logic in its reasoning.14 1 In Ayers,
the Georgia Supreme Court had occasion to examine the relevance of mari-
juana metabolites in a driver charged with reckless driving.' 42 The defendant
in Ayers argued that the marijuana metabolites were not at all relevant to the
inquiry into whether she was driving recklessly.14 3 She argued under Love that
they cannot be considered.
The Georgia Supreme Court correctly recognized that the behavior in
question was reckless driving, not driving while impaired, and that evidence of
actual impairment would be relevant if it came from illegal marijuana use or
legal marijuana use." It held:
Love does not apply to a charge of reckless driving or vehicular homicide based on
reckless driving. Nothing in Love implied that reckless driving based on marijuana
consumption could not be prosecuted. The violation of equal protection found in
Love was grounded in the recognition that legal marijuana users pose the same threat
as illegal users when controlling a moving vehicle, making disparate treatment with-
out a rational basis.
14 5
138 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.200 (West 2007).
139 Love v. State, 517 S.E.2d 53, 57 (Ga. 1999). Jessica Williams made this argument to the
Nevada Supreme Court and although at the time her case was heard, Nevada had already
legalized medical marijuana, the court rejected her argument because at the time of her
arrest, the statute was not yet enacted. Williams 1, 50 P.3d at 1121. Additionally, in dicta,
the court stated that it would see a legitimate state interest in deterring illegal drug use
sufficient to form a rational basis even in the presence of a medical marijuana statute. Id.
" Love v. State, 517 S.E.2d 53, 57 (Ga. 1999).
141 See, e.g., Ayers v. State, 534 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2000).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 76-78 (Ga. 2000). More specifically, the defendant argued that Love also rendered
unconstitutional that portion of the statute that prohibits anyone from driving while under the
influence of any drug to the extent that it is less safe to drive.
'44 Id. at 78.
145 Id.
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The Georgia Supreme Court has struck the proper balance in determining
when evidence of marijuana use is relevant. This court allows such evidence to
prove whether a driver was actually impaired, not as a substitute for convicting
a driver of being impaired merely on the presence of drug metabolites. This
further demonstrates how the science of marijuana metabolism is ill-suited to a
definitive proscribed level in the body. There is no recommended prescription
for medical marijuana, except to use it. It defies dose quantitation and remains
in the user's system for days to weeks.14 6 Now in Georgia, all marijuana users
are equally protected in that they may drive so long as they are not impaired.
They will be judged on a standard of actual impairment.
C. Veronica Schmidt
The inequity of the distinction between legal and illegal drug users is prac-
tically demonstrated by comparing Jessica Williams's case with that of another
woman in southern Nevada who was later responsible for a deadly accident.
On March 14, 2005, Veronica Schmidt was driving her sport utility vehicle in
Las Vegas when she crashed into a bus shelter, killing four individuals, three of
whom were children. 147
It was discovered that Veronica Schmidt had been taking Xanax®, a cen-
tral nervous system depressant, for which she had a legal prescription.
148
Schmidt, as did Williams, claims that she fell asleep. 149 Schmidt failed a field
sobriety test immediately after the crash and fell asleep in the patrol car on the
way to booking.' 5 ° The police department criminologist determined that the
level of drug in her system was appropriate for the prescription; however a
forensic toxicologist for the Las Vegas City Attorney's office disagreed.' l
Additionally, the Director of Emergency Service at University Medical Center
and Chairman of Nevada's Homeland Security Commission opined that the
drug levels were "huge" and that "nobody would prescribe that much to
take."' 5 2 The toxicologist for the Las Vegas City Attorney's office stated that
her blood levels indicated that she took more than twice the amount
prescribed. 15
3
The Clark County district attorney decided not to prosecute because of a
perceived difficulty in convicting under the impairment standard.' 4 Since
Schmidt was taking the drug pursuant to a legal prescription, she was not sub-
146 See Marijuana Science, supra Section III.
14 Frank Curreri, Horrific Scene: Four Die at Bus Stop, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 15, 2005
at IA; Frank Geary, Driver Indicted in Crash That Killed Six-Year-Old Girl, Relatives, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 2, 2005 at 7B.
"I Frank Geary, Driver Had Drug Xanex in System, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 25, 2005 at
IB; PDR, supra note 80, at 2294.
149 Brian Haynes, Deadly Bus Stop Crash: Driver Had High Level of Xanax, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Aug. 19, 2005 at IA; Steve Sebelius, Bad Idea Jeans, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 9,
2004 at 9B.
150 Brian Haynes, Charges Filed in a Stop Crash, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Sept. 8, 2005 at lB.
151 Glenn Puit and Brian Haynes, Prosecutors Defend Decision, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug.
20, 2005 at IA.
152 Haynes, Deadly Crash, supra note 149, at IA.
15 Haynes, Charges Filed, supra note 150, at lB.
4 Haynes, Deadly Crash, supra note 149, at IA.
[Vol. 7:570
DWI AND DRUGS
ject to the per se DUID statute, and the state would have to prove that she was
actually impaired. 155 Responding to continued public pressure, citing the high
drug levels and failed field sobriety test, the city attorney's office filed misde-
meanor charges in Municipal Court.'5 6 If she were prosecuted on felony
charges she could have faced two to eight years for each count; under the mis-
demeanor charges she faces only a maximum of six months.' 57 On March 29,
2006, Schmidt agreed to a plea that imposed eight months of house arrest and
one year of probation.' 58
Comparing Veronica Schmidt's case with Jessica Williams's case illus-
trates how an individual may actually drive while impaired with deadly results
and yet be sanctioned far less severely than an individual who might not be
actually impaired while driving. It appears that Veronica Schmidt was actually
impaired based on a toxicologist's conclusion that she had taken more than
twice the prescribed amount.'5 9 On the other hand, in light of the scientific
evidence that demonstrates that the effects of marijuana are gone within two to
four hours, it is far from certain that Jessica Williams was actually impaired.
This example of disparate treatment should certainly be relevant when consid-
ering the legitimacy of Nevada's DUID law.
D. Other States' Laws
A majority of states with per se DUID statutes take an approach similar to
Nevada's by setting the threshold for conviction at any detectable quantity or
by using the federal drug testing standards. 6 ° A few states have statutes that
appear to take into account the potential for convicting drivers who are not
actually impaired. 16 1 Virginia's per se DUID statute only applies to users of
methamphetamine, cocaine, or phencyclidine.162 Ohio's per se DUID statute
provides for different detection levels of marijuana depending on whether the
155 Id.
156 Haynes, Charges Filed, supra note 150, at lB.
151 Id.; Week in Review: Southern Nevadans Rush to Aid Hurricane Victims, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Sept. 11, 2005 at 3B; Glenn Puit, Driver Accepts Deal, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 29,
2006, at IA; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3795 (West 2007). Schmidt faced six counts in
Municipal Court: reckless driving, DUI, speed too fast for conditions, failure to maintain a
lane, obstructing an officer, and contempt. Criminal Complaint, Las Vegas v. Veronica
Schmidt, Las Vegas Muni. Court, No. C629119, Aug. 23, 2005. The last two charges were
for an unrelated incident. Id.
158 Puit, supra note 157, at IA.
159 Haynes, Charges Filed, supra note 150, at lB.
16 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381(A)(3) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 4177(a)(6)
(West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a)(6) (West 2007); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
§ 11-501(a)(6) (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 9 -30-5-1(1)(c) (West 2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321J.2(l)(c) (West 2007); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(8) (West 200); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169A.20(1)(7) (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-138.1(a)(3) (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.19(A)(I)(j) (West 2007); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3802(d) (West 2007); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2(b)(2) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517(2) (West 2007); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-266 (West 2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.63(1)(a) (West 2007).
161 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20(i)(7) (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.19(A)(1)(j) (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (West 2007).
162 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (West 2007).
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driver has only evidence of marijuana use or whether there is evidence that he
consumed multiple illegal drugs or illegal drugs and alcohol.' 63
Minnesota's per se DUID statute exempts marijuana.164 In considering a
per se DUID statute, the legislature recognized that evidence of marijuana con-
sumption might be present long after the use. 16 5 They were concerned that
mandating per se impairment might criminalize too much behavior and instead
funded more Drug Recognition Experts. 166 Drug Recognition Experts are able
to determine more accurately whether drivers are impaired and by what sub-
stance and they are available anywhere statewide within two hours. 167 Their
specialization and expertise have been essential in building strong evidence to
convict drivers on a standard of actual impairment.168 If Nevada had opted to
go the route of funding Drug Recognition Experts instead of its current DWI
statutory scheme, there likely would have been more consistency across cases
like Jessica Williams and Veronica Schmidt.
E. Character Evidence
Using evidence of prior drug use to convict a person of driving while
intoxicated amounts to convicting someone for their prior bad act. The per se
DUID statute uses evidence of prior drug use as irrefutable evidence that the
person is driving while intoxicated. The rule against character evidence in Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404 and its counterpart in Nevada embody a concept
expressed in common law dating back to the early 1800s. 169 This rule forbids
introducing evidence against a criminal defendant that goes not to the issue at
hand, but solely to the character of the defendant.' 7 ° In this context, the term
character means: as it illustrates reputation.
17 1
In feudal times, trial by reputation was the rule.' 72 People had great confi-
dence in their ability to assess the character of an individual accurately. 173 As
the world industrialized, urbanization radically increased population density,
making it far more difficult to have accurate knowledge of those with whom
one interacts in society. 14 The rule limiting character evidence exists for sev-
eral reasons. First, evidence of bad character or past criminal acts would
undoubtedly have great weight with juries. 17' As a jury weighs the evidence in
163 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(A)(1)(j) (West 2006).
'64 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20(1)(7) (West 2007).
163 Telephone interview with attorney Jim Cleary, Legislative Analyst for the Minnesota
House of Representatives Research Department for thirty years (Nov. 21, 2005).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 THOMAS PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 6-7 (3d ed., London, Luke
Hanfard & Sons 1808); FED. R. EVID. 404; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.045 (West 2007);
David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the
Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1168 (1998).
170 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); see also State v. Pearce, 15 Nev.
188, 190 (1880).
'' Michelson, 335 U.S. at 477.
172 Leonard, supra note 169, at 1194.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1196.
175 People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
[Vol. 7:570
DWI AND DRUGS
a proceeding, the fact that a defendant exhibited poor character at some point in
the past might be treated as an irrefutable negative indicator that could distract
the jury from its purpose of evaluating guilt or innocence in the issue at hand.
One may rightly argue that this evidence has great probative value and that its
inclusion could be essential in determining guilt. 176 To say that "A is quarrel-
some, therefore he probably committed this assault" is a natural extension of
common sense and, generally speaking, may be accurate. 177 However, intro-
ducing such character evidence at trial is problematic because the jury will
likely not relegate it to its proper position in the determination of guilt in the
specific case: "on the contrary, [it will] weigh too much with the jury and...
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a
fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge."' 78
Second, allowing evidence of bad character presents the risk that a jury
will decide that the individual's prior acts are sufficient to warrant punishment
in the current situation "even if he should happen to be innocent momenta-
rily." 179 Permitting this evidence could give legal effect to juries' prejudices
with regard to religion, politics, and morals, despite their best intentions.' 8 °
Additionally, juries could decide to convict not based on guilt of the crime at
issue, but based on a decision that in light of the poor character of the defen-
dant, a judgment of guilt would prevent what they may determine to be a cer-
tain likelihood of future crimes.' It is under these circumstances that the ban
against character evidence derives its greatest strength.
Further, the degree to which a defendant would be unfairly surprised and
thus unduly burdened also militates against allowing character evidence.' 82 A
prime example is where a defense attorney is confronted with evidence of prior
misconduct that was not revealed to him by the defendant.' 83 The defense
would thereafter be at great disadvantage in trying to lessen the impact of this
evidence.' 84 Finally, allowing character evidence of past acts could present an
entirely new sub-issue as to their validity, which could in turn complicate the
issue actually being tried. 1
8 5
The principles embodied in the prohibition against character evidence
relate to the issue of per se DUID statutes in that a prosecution for driving
while impaired may be based primarily on a prior bad act: illegal drug use.
The evidence of prior drug use is being used to characterize the defendant as a
law breaker. The evidence is not being used to demonstrate with any degree of
probativeness that the defendant is impaired or that the defendant's driving is
affected in any way.
176 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 477.
177 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 1 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 57, at 272 (2d ed. 1923).
178 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476.
179 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997).
180 People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 574 (N.Y. 1840).
181 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181.
182 Leonard, supra note 169, at 1185. Wigmore considered this the "chief reason" for the
ban against character evidence. Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476; Leonard, supra note 169, at 1185.
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In certain cases a driver may in fact be impaired, based logically on the
presence of drug metabolites in her body. However, at the levels of metabolites
proscribed under the Nevada statute, there is no way to determine when their
presence is probative and when their presence is not probative.
The use of propensity evidence is permitted in certain narrow circum-
stances and for specific policy reasons.186 There have historically been com-
mon law exceptions to the prohibition of propensity evidence. 187 Currently
there are several statutory exceptions enumerated in the rules of evidence.
188
Rule 404(b) itself describes when evidence of prior bad acts may be admitted
into evidence where the purpose is not to demonstrate a propensity to engage in
certain behavior, but to allow the jury to draw other inferences from the evi-
dence.1 89 Examples of this include the use of evidence to demonstrate proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake.1 90 These exceptions recognize that there is often probative value
attached to evidence of prior bad acts and that the party seeking to use them
must be permitted so long as there is a valid, non-propensity based reason.191
The rules that allow evidence of prior sexual misconduct, enacted in 1994,
also provide an exception to the prohibition against character evidence. The
rules were from the outset, and continue to be, somewhat controversial.1 92
They allow for propensity evidence to be admitted in contravention to the ages
old principle for very specific reasons. 193 In cases of molestation or other sex-
ual misconduct it is thought that there exists an exceptionally unique pattern
that can be established.1 94 A defendant who has in the past engaged in these
acts is particularly disposed to repeat them.' 95 Additionally there is often a
difficulty in proffering evidence against the defendant because the analysis is
reduced to a swearing match. 196 Lastly, Congress felt it singularly important to
protect child victims of molestation from being the only source of evidence.' 97
These rules allow evidence of the prior bad acts of the defendant to be used,
thus bolstering the credibility of the accuser.198 In prosecuting DWI cases, the
state does not need additional credibility, and certainly not on par with that
given to victims of sexual crimes.
These provisions that allow for an exception to the general rule targeted
specific instances where admission of the evidence is both relevant and proba-
186 See FED. R. EVID. 404-15.
187 See, e.g., Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (common law has recog-
nized the "depraved sexual instinct" exception).
188 See generally FED. R. EvID. 413-15.
189 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997); David J.
Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1995).
193 140 Cong. Rec. H8968, 8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
194 Id.
195 Id.; but cf. Baker, supra note 192 (these conflicting sources further illuminate the con-
tinuing disagreement on the wisdom of the 1994 changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
196 140 Cong. Rec. H8968, 8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
197 Id.
198 FED. R. EvID. 413-15.
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tive of the elements to be proven.' 9 9 The ban against character evidence was
not enacted to prohibit irrelevant evidence, but to prevent over-reliance on it.
20 0
In using evidence of drug metabolites of any quantity, the Nevada statute seeks
to introduce potentially irrelevant evidence. Such evidence cannot be said to
have any tendency to make the existence of the possibility of driving while
impaired more or less likely when that evidence may consist of only proof that
the defendant has used drugs in the past.
The motive for the per se DUID statute appears to be congruent with those
of the statutory exceptions to the character evidence rule embodied in rules 413
through 415. Both provisions may be used to help prevent crime by giving
prosecutors more tools in their arsenal with which to gain convictions. The
difference lies in their relevance. The statutory exceptions in the rules are
meaningful because they are relevant despite their prejudicial value. Whereas
the per se DUID statute, in cases of low levels of metabolites, simply permits
evidence of prior drug use for no relevant reason whatever.
In Jessica Williams's case the jury was called upon to determine whether
she was actually impaired and they declared she was not.2 0 1 The statute then
permitted conviction based completely on the fact that she had used illegal
drugs in the recent past, thus evincing her criminal character.2 °2
The statute permitted the court to accept this proof of bad character as
reason enough to find her guilty of the far more serious offense of felony DWI
simply because she was guilty of the lesser charge of illegal drug use. If the
legislature determines that the use of illegal drugs warrants a more severe pun-
ishment than that which currently exists, it should so legislate. Such a decision
would be within its police power. But to attempt to increase the success rate of
DUID prosecutions by permitting conviction not based on impairment is to
sanction societal prejudice and use it for expediency in obtaining a higher rate
of DUID convictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Jessica Williams was convicted for DWI based not on any evidence of
impairment but based on a statutory presumption of guilt that attached to the
presence of drug metabolites in her body. She was sentenced to eighteen to
forty-eight years. Veronica Schmidt was subjected to no statutory presumption
but was reportedly quite impaired by prescription medications. She was given
a plea deal that only required her to serve eight months of house arrest and one
year of probation. These inconsistent results are indicative of the ill-considered
approach taken by states like Nevada in attempting to make the roadways safe
from impaired drivers. Using evidence of prior drug use without any indication
of impairment to conclude that a driver is impaired is nothing more than using a
defendant's prior bad act to convict that driver of DWI.
The per se DUID statutes fail to make any reasonable link between drug
use and impaired driving at the current cutoff levels. This violates the equal
199 Id.
200 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476.
201 Williams I, 50 P.3d at 1119.
202 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3795 (West 2007).
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protection rights of unimpaired drivers who have proscribed drug metabolites
in their bodies because the relationship is irrational. There is scientific evi-
dence that demonstrates how drug metabolites can still be present in a person
long after that person is no longer impaired. Furthermore, the Nevada statute
makes no room for legal users of medical marijuana, thereby violating the
equal protection rights of medical marijuana users.
A rational statutory scheme would exempt marijuana and any drug that
demonstrably remains detectable in the body for a period of time that exceeds
the period when a drug test can reliably show impairment. Minnesota's statutes
and policies focusing on funding Drug Recognition Experts is a reasoned
approach that accounts for the physiology of marijuana metabolism without
sacrificing the important goal of traffic safety.
